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The central concerns of this special issue – emotion, authority, and national 
character – are arguably among the most pressing issues facing social research-
ers in the current geo-political context. By contrast to the global political cli-
mate of the early 1990s – when the Eastern bloc was collapsing, when Europe 
was still in the euphoria of its expansion, and when a largely US-fuelled re-
newed wave of globalisation had not yet met with substantial nation-state re-
sistance – the past few years have seen a growing number and range of counter-
reactions of a particular kind and character. Where in the 1990s sociologists 
were predicting an imminent end to the nation state, they now must confront a 
substantial shift in public opinion and in concomitant social developments, 
which together have brought the nation state back into sharp focus. 
This renewed significance of the nation state and, in particular, of debates 
about “national identity,” can be witnessed in the struggles surrounding recent 
waves of mass migration which find particular expression in the increasingly 
bitter and polarised political discourses surrounding the reception, accommoda-
tion, assimilation, and integration of “outsider” groups by the “insiders” of 
destination nations throughout the “West” – in Europe, America, and Australia. 
Such conflicts characteristically pivot on the emotionally invested “we-images” 
of particular social groups; they have emerged not just within but between the 
states affected. Just as the successor states of the collapsing Eastern bloc delib-
erately reconstituted themselves as individual “nations” – as was the case also 
after the disintegration of Yugoslavia – the supra-national European Union is 
increasingly being positioned by some of its member-states as a tyrannical 
geopolitical monolith, a threat to national identity and character.  
Similarly, the deeply penetrating and far-reaching economic and financial 
crisis of the last decade has undergirded conflicts within states (between elites 
and masses, winners and losers of globalisation), and between states. Public, 
mediatised discourses have tended to focus on simplistic explanations of such 
conflicts, typically by means of focusing principally, sometimes exclusively, 
upon the personalities of the leaders involved (Trump, Erdogan, Putin, and so 
on) and their actions on the “world stage.” Such tendencies are compounded by 
collective stereotypes and hostile imagery – for instance, German Chancellor 
Merkel was depicted in mainstream Greek news media with a Hitler-styled 
moustache – which draw historical comparisons dating back to Second World 
War. In the case of the UK, debates surrounding “Brexit” have unreflexively 
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invoked similar historical recollections, here also tapping into a historically 
enduring vein of “splendid isolationism” and an imagined “golden age” of 
“greatness” predicated upon Britain’s colonial past (see Dunning and Hughes 
in this volume). 
Additionally, the last decade in particular has witnessed the rise of national-
ist parties in countries across Europe. In 2016, nearly 52 % of British citizens 
voted for Brexit1; 49.21 % of the Hungarians for Fidesz (2018)2; 43.6% for PiS 
in Poland (2019)3; 16.2% for the FPÖ in Austria (2019); and roughly 13% for 
rightist parties in the Netherlands and Sweden (Thorleifsson 2018). Despite the 
core significance of this resurgence of nationalism, populism, and authoritari-
anism, it is perhaps all the more curious that notions of “national character” or 
“national habitus” (and the terms are by no means entirely inter-changeable) 
are afforded relatively little attention, and have attracted little scrutiny, in both 
sociological and lay discourse, even where whole states and their governments 
are to be judged. And yet the more intense and numerous interactions taking 
place between states and blocs have become, the more pressing the need has 
become to know something about the role of such differences. Crucial in this 
respect are the enduring sets of “we-feelings” – we-you-feelings or we-they-
feelings according to Elias (2010 [1987]; also Elias 2012b [1970]) – which are 
frequently mobilised in the service of rational and/or legitimate national inter-
ests, forming thus a close, but fraught alliance. The acute influence of such 
feelings can be witnessed, for instance, in relation to debates of the past few 
years surrounding the treatment of refugees by Central European countries of 
the former Eastern bloc. These countries, and now also Italy, are portrayed as 
having failed to adapt to normative standards of empathy as these are defined 
(albeit not followed) in the model-setting centres of Western Europe: such 
actions are deemed less “civilised” than those of, say, Germany, France, and 
the UK. Within the crisis-ridden EU, accusations and counter-accusations now 
abound. Time and again, seemingly unchecked “we” and “they” feelings un-
derpin much of the debate: Italians and the French complain of German “disci-
pline” and “austerity”; conversely, the Germans bitterly oppose Romance “levi-
ty” and “sloppiness.” 
Social and political theorists and researchers have tended to approach these 
developments in ways that correspond to their respective paradigmatic creeds, 
often involving implicit, extra-scientific norms that largely go unchecked. For 
example, a good deal of empirical survey research, with its pronounced tenden-
cy towards relatively short time spans, has typically involved the employ of 
                                                             
│  
questionnaire items that infer a distinction between uncouth variants of crude 
“nationalism,” and forms of “patriotism” implicitly regarded as more palatable 
– but only just (see the argument developed in Höllinger, Fleiß, and Kuzmics 
2012; cf. Hjerm 1998). This distinction – between patriotism and nationalism – 
has long been invoked in social scientific circles, with the former patriotic 
national pride understood to be grounded in an inner-directed “positive” identi-
fication with the institutions of a nation, and a more ethnocentric national pride 
or nationalism conversely understood as expressive of “negative” feelings of 
national superiority, directed outwards against foreigners (Haller 1996; Blank 
2003; Cohrs et al. 2004; Davidov 2009; Höllinger, Fleiß, and Kuzmics 2012, 
45). The same goes for empirical studies which juxtapose more or less “prob-
lematic” forms of ethnic national identity with a more positively evaluated 
civic national identity (see, for example, A. D. Smith 1991). 
Similarly, normative undercurrents in social theory have long found expres-
sion through a striving towards the ideal imagery of peaceful and inclusive 
economic co-development, with the nation-state initially seen as its major 
guarantor. However, what was perceived to be positive for social inclusion at 
the level of the nation-state (Marshall 1992) later came to be seen as an obsta-
cle to supra-national integration. Partly as a reaction to the wars conducted by a 
US-led coalition in the Middle East, partly also to formulate the contrast be-
tween American neo-liberalism and the model of European welfare-states, 
theories were formulated that treated Europe as a peaceful moral hegemon in 
the making (Rifkin 2004) and, in these analyses, European nation-states ap-
peared as atavisms. For some time now, a plethora of sociological sub-
disciplines and sub-discourses have tended increasingly to treat nations and 
nation-states as something approaching an empirical “taboo” – one that would 
be better avoided. Even where nation states were compared, for instance, in the 
varieties-of-capitalism approach (Hall-Soskice 2001), they were typically nei-
ther treated in a historical way nor considered in terms of we-feelings and 
habitus; the same might be said with regard of the comparative analysis of 
national welfare-regimes (Esping-Andersen 1990).  
This neglect of national we-feelings presents a primary concern of this Spe-
cial Issue. “The end of the nation-state” (Guéhenno 2000) was announced some 
two decades ago – not only for the European context, but worldwide – it was 
understood to be predicated upon the increasing salience of modern infor-
mation technologies and their influence on the global division of labour. More 
recent developments, however, suggest this judgement was premature. Accord-
ingly, this Special Issue comprises analyses that are able to explore state-
generated sentiments and emotions in an historically informed processual man-
ner: approaches that offer the potential to explore the role of “national charac-
ter” and “national habitus” in ways that move considerably beyond current 
mainstream political debates and their frequent recourse to national stereotypes. 
Norbert Elias’s work can be seen as an exemplar in this respect (Elias 2013 
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[1989], Elias 2012a [1939], Elias and Dunning (2008 [1986]); as are some 
more recent extensions of this approach to such issue and concerns: e.g., 
Kuzmics and Axtmann (2007), Mennell (2007), or Kuzmics and Haring (2013). 
Contributions to this Special Issue focus both on emotions whose sociogen-
esis derives from the inner dynamics of states and on such emotions that can be 
traced back to the inter-state level with influences also from outside. To the 
former belong the ups and downs of internal political currents and conflicts 
(where, for example, parties of the right might now profit from the emotions 
that once guided parties of the left); central to the latter are the external entan-
glements that arise in the competition and cooperation between states. The 
emphasis of these contributions is upon engagement with medium and longer-
term historical processes in order to avoid what Norbert Elias once called 
Zustandsreduktion – the reduction of processes to static categories, with all 
their associated categorical mistakes. 
 
The fusion of history and sociology has generated, so far, numerous approaches 
which attempt to come to terms with the past in order to help address some 
important riddles of the present (see Abrams 1982; Smith 1991). The names of 
Weber, Marx, and Durkheim can, of course, be included in this respect. Their 
analyses did not focus primarily on emotions, although they played their role, 
each conceived in different ways. Weber’s “Protestant Ethic” is related to a 
specific kind of habitus; alienation under capitalism cannot be understood 
without recourse to emotion and anomic suicide is not simply the outcome of a 
rationally balancing choice. However, common to all these developmental 
theories was a focus on institutions. When we narrow the scope of the explana-
tory puzzles under scrutiny to two – the dynamics of state-competition and the 
chances of a strong civil society that can limit the aspirations of central power 
within states – then we still face an overwhelming concentration on macro 
issues, typically at the expense of attention towards the emotional experience of 
the people involved. The following examples do not claim to be exhaustive but 
they aim at giving an idea of what is necessary to better understand the con-
temporary predicament dealt with in this Special Issue, and of what is lacking 
when we omit a consideration of emotions. 
The two topics that we have touched upon above – the dynamics of Europe-
an and later global state-competition and changes in the power-distribution 
within these states from largely aristocratic and princely domination to a partic-
ipation of broader strata – are certainly interrelated. To make sense of such 
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developments, historians, political scientists, and historical sociologists alike 
have variously attempted to bind various strands of analysis and argumentation 
together. Broadly speaking, we might understand Europe as partitioned into 
three broad historical regions (Anderson 1974; Szücs 1988): the West, as inher-
itor of the Roman Empire through a lineage linking late Antiquity and Christi-
anity with Barbarian Germanic elements; the East, arising from a fusion be-
tween Byzantine theocracy with Slavic peasantry resulting in Eastern 
absolutism and serfdom, under the influence of Eastern nomadic hordes as long 
lasting threat; and Eastern Central Europe as involving hybrid variations of 
both structures in Poland, Prussia, and Habsburg Austria (including Hungary). 
Each of these historical regions has followed its own trajectory of development. 
Such a model involves something of a synthesis both drawing upon, and de-
veloped in distinction from, a range of different analyses. Charles Tilly (1990), 
for instance, draws similar lines of distinction in his comparison of European 
continental states like France or Spain with their standing armies, exerting upon 
their subjects particular forms of “coercion,” with seafaring, trading states like 
Holland, England, or Venice with their strong navies that focused upon seizing 
the means of “persuasion” rather more than through direct means of physical 
violence to ensure the collaboration of their citizens. By contrast, Perry Ander-
son’s (1974) theory of state-development, following Marx, concentrated more 
on internal aspects of the state’s structures of domination. His categories in-
clude – besides the main cases of Western and Eastern Absolutism – the North-
West European case of Scandinavia with its partial feudalism, due principally 
to the lack of Roman influence, and South-Eastern Europe, also devoid of 
feudalism but developed under the influence of Byzantine structures without 
slave-labour. To this we might add Immanuel Wallerstein’s (1974, 1980) also 
economically-centred account in which is correlated the strength of the state 
and its position in the larger world-system (centre, semi-periphery, periphery). 
Here, the power sources of physical violence and war are somewhat down-
played, or are conceived principally as epiphenomenon of economic domina-
tion. 
Other authors, with whom we find a greater affinity, have avoided such re-
ductionism. For example, Michael Mann (1986, 1988) distinguishes between 
military, economic, ideological, and political power, linking geopolitics to 
internal power dynamics as well. Mann avoids both the economic reductionism 
of Marxist authors and the idealisations of the rule of norms in structural-
functionalism. Perry Anderson too, who, in a collection of essays on the “ori-
gins” and consequences of European integration (Anderson 2009), has sought 
to advance an attempt to adapt his previously developed insights to the situa-
tion as it was unfolding some three or so decades after he undertook his origi-
nal analysis. Listing various accounts and explanations for the rise of the EU 
and trying to evaluate its effect on the development of capitalism and democra-
cy, he distinguishes four different approaches: the “neofunctionalist” approach 
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(Haas 1958); a “neorealist” interpretation (Milward 1984) which also stresses 
predominantly the economic advantages open markets offer for each single 
state; his own theory of 1995 that aims at transcending the economic frame-
work by stressing the subject of US domination and of French attempts to get 
rid of it; and finally approaches which have tried to come to terms with the 
unexpected breakdown of Soviet power and the extension of the influence of 
the European Community over Eastern Europe without using military means. 
Taken together, such approaches render Europe as a new, peaceful “Empire” 
with only Münkler (2005) discussing the relationship between the US as an 
empire and Europe as its subsystem. 
Notwithstanding the significance of such contributions to enhancing our un-
derstandings of Europe, in order to better apprehend the dynamics of state-
competition and empire-formation, at least two historically informed analyses 
can stand for a larger genre. Paul Kennedy’s seminal discussion of the “Rise 
and Fall of the Great Powers” (1988), and John Mearsheimer’s “Tragedy of 
Great Power Politics” (2001) as a plea for his doctrine of “offensive realism,” 
offer many insights into the constraints in which states typically find them-
selves caught when they are involved in struggles for the bid of mastery. How-
ever, even these analyses tend towards the portrayal of actors on the world 
stage (whole countries through, respectively, their political elites) as entirely 
rational. What is lacking in these narratives is sufficient consideration of the 
role of emotions beyond “rational” fears and, in certain limited cases, of a 
state- or nation-induced habitus that is understood to be related to success or 
failure in avoiding or managing wars or as arising from class-conflict and dom-
ination structures characteristic of power-balances within states.  
The limitations of explanations that neglect the role of emotions can be il-
lustrated by numerous examples. For instance, both Kennedy and Mearsheimer 
explain the decline of the Habsburg Monarchy in warlike state-competition 
between 1914-18 as principally the consequence of the behaviour of misguided 
elites. However, the decline arguably links to a far more complex nexus of 
developments. Ancient Austria did not only produce a quite specific, patrimo-
nial-bureaucratic architecture of domination, resulting in a kind of partly be-
nign, partly hesitating and unpredictable authoritarianism, but also a century-
old military habitus of slowness, indecision, and hesitation that mirrored the 
relative weakness of the political centre against the centrifugal forces of estates 
and nations (Kuzmics and Haring 2013). Neither Kennedy nor Mearsheimer let 
any kind of “habitus,” or even emotions, interfere with the macro-structural 
constraints they consider to be causally relevant. The same goes for the expla-
nations offered for the rise of an “authoritarian” absolutism by Anderson or 
Mann, and for the obstacles to a “civil society”: without any reference to the 
emotional experience of authoritarian rule, such analyses remain incomplete at 
best, and pale and hollow at worst. 
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In his essay on “Changes in the We-I- Balance” (Elias [1987] 2010, 137-208), 
Elias developed the concept of a “survival-unit” in accordance with his pro-
cess-sociological understanding of the development of human societies. Ac-
cording to Elias, survival units are human collectivities comprising, to greatly 
varying degrees, a combination of three key facets: 1) controls over violence, 
2) control of nature by economic means and production; 3) and control of the 
means of orientation, principally knowledge and symbols (Elias [1983] 2009). 
Such units can be seen as protecting otherwise unprotected human beings by 
forming social bodies able to defend them, often in combination with their 
capability to attack other competing units. The development of survival units is 
but one stage in the process that culminates in the formation of what we call a 
“state.” In turn, “states” themselves do not develop alone, but inevitably in 
relation to one another: in “systems” of states, systems of competing “survival 
units.” At first sight, it might appear odd to think of nation states as “survival 
units”; that this is so is, for Elias, in and of itself significant – it relates to the 
complexities of figurations in contemporary societies. In employing the term, 
Elias has numerous senses in mind. First, Elias lists the needs members of 
survival units have for physical safety, including protection from war and natu-
ral catastrophes – such relative protections form the core of a unit’s survival-
function. Second, he refers to military, economic and scientific development, 
and competition. Third, Elias mentions the function a survival-unit has for 
securing continuity and tradition in the memory of coming generations – the 
survival of a “way of life,” so to speak, and the strong emotional attachments 
that are developed in relation to anything that expresses this. That we always 
encounter we-I balances – that there can be no I without a we – means that, 
somewhat paradoxically, even in the case of the most altruistic and ostensibly 
“self-less” acts of individual sacrifice where people are prepared to risk their 
own lives for their group, such acts invariably involve self-love, narcissistic 
gratification, and collective devotion, since human beings are part and parcel of 
the groups towards which such feelings are oriented and from which constitu-
ent group members draw their sense of belonging. The disappearance of a state 
or tribe by integration into a higher unit can, thus, lead to a catastrophic deple-
tion of meaning, the deeds and suffering of previous generations become sense-
less, a kind of “collective dying” occurs, generating deep feelings of mourning 
(Elias [1987] 2010, 137-208).  
These different dimensions of the “survival”-function each have their effects 
on we-feelings, we-images, we-I-balances, forms of national habitus, and we-
identities. Such effects, in turn, vary according to the character and develop-
ment of the survival group in question. For instance, the we-component relative 
to the I-component is much stronger in individual European nation-states than 
in Europe as a supranational entity. It was, as Elias’s magnum opus On the 
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Process of Civilisation (2012a) documents in meticulous detail, the individual 
nation-states of Europe that brought about previously unthinkable adjustments 
to the personality structures of their members. For Elias, the formative primacy 
of the habitus-formation of national “survival” units, nation states, endures 
such that it typically “lags” behind the newly felt necessities of integration 
associated with more expansive survival units (such as those of supra-national 
groupings, perhaps even identification with humanity as a whole), and as such 
exerts a “drag effect” which makes adaptation more difficult.  
For Elias, new and higher-level survival-units will rise to the extent that 
growing interdependence between units at lower levels of integration makes 
them useful and necessary, replacing the increasingly notional sense of autar-
chy or self-sufficiency of individual nation-states. The dominance of the na-
tion-state is, according to Elias, a quite recent European phenomenon, histori-
cally speaking. It had, gradually, come to replace many centuries of older 
dynastic states with loyalties towards prince, king, or emperor and with bonds 
between aristocrats of several European states being, in key cases, stronger 
than those towards the lower classes of their own state. The “nationalisation” of 
these states went hand in hand with the growing power of the bourgeoisie, 
particularly as their language came to be transformed into the national language 
of France, Italy, or Germany. 
In more recent times, a growing number of trans- and international networks 
called into question the state’s ability to secure protection and survival for all 
of its citizens such that not all of the three survival functions Elias identifies 
may consist in the domain of any particular state’s power machineries. For 
instance, small states may lack the ability to attack or to defend themselves 
with their means of military power drawn from a somewhat asymmetrical 
interdependence with super-powers or military alliances like NATO. Another 
example is the EU which enables each member state to increase its economic 
weight in the world. Above all, some groups in modern societies, like highly 
educated specialists, are less dependent on their state’s capacities than others in 
order to protect their interests and to gain knowledge and orientation. 
The concept of “survival unit” is useful in as much as it serves as an alterna-
tive to approaches to historical sociology which exclusively focus on economic 
aspects of social developments. In understanding nation states as “survival 
units” (or as units which are going to lose some of their traditional survival 
functions), we come to recognise how the aspect of collective violence and 
power seems to follow – at least partly – its own logic partially independently 
from economic determinism. In contrast to geopolitical approaches – like Ken-
nedy’s and Mearsheimer’s – the concept of “survival unit” allows us to ac-
commodate both global economic, military, and political interdependencies, on 
the one hand, and state-internal affairs as well as the formation of habitus and 
patterns of emotions, on the other. Indeed, Elias’s approach permits a means of 
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containing these “macro” and “micro” foci within a coherent unified analytical 
scheme. We briefly explore some of the means how in the sections that follow. 
In the sociological literature on nationalism and related phenomena, one finds a 
number of concepts and constructs which relate to different aspects of an indi-
vidual’s emotional attachment to his and her country: national identity, feeling 
of national belonging, national pride, patriotism, nationalism, chauvinism, 
ethnocentrism, and so on (Haller 1996; Hjerm 1998; Blank 2003; Weiss 2003). 
The reading of these and other works on the topic shows how difficult it is to 
separate different kinds of nation-related feelings from each other conceptually, 
to define them precisely, and to operationalise these concepts empirically 
(Höllinger, Fleiß, and Kuzmics 2012). Contrary to the assumption of a crude 
dichotomy between patriotism and nationalism, Dekker, Malová, and Hoogen-
doorn (2003) assume that national orientations include several dimensions or 
aspects, such as “national feeling” (feeling of belonging to one’s nation), “na-
tional liking” (sympathy for one’s country and its population), “national pride” 
(pride in one’s country and its inhabitants), and “national superiority” (feeling 
superior to the population of other countries). According to them, these aspects 
do not constitute opposites, but rather steps on a cumulative, hierarchically 
ordered continuum. This means that reaching a higher level through, for in-
stance, having feelings of national superiority, presupposes that the respective 
person has positive values of national identification on the lower levels (feels 
they belong to the nation or is proud of their nation). The problem of many 
attempts to capture nation-state based we-feelings is that there is an immense 
difference between those periods when the unit one belongs to is not chal-
lenged from outside – in peacetime, enjoying high living standards, not being 
threatened by enemies, other states, or supra-national federations – and very 
special times, when the survival unit is perceived to be under attack. In “nor-
mal” times, the rhetoric of nationalism sounds rather strange and can easily be 
seen as an “empty nationalism” (Billig 1995), devoid of all practical meaning. 
A close reading of war novels – as, for instance, during the First World War – 
makes overwhelmingly clear what strong emotions really look like. The sec-
ond, often overlooked aspect is hidden in the term we-I-balance: modern socie-
ties develop a division of labour that gives room to an abundant individualism 
of private profit-seeking, pleasure-oriented, cosmopolitan “individuals” who 
feel threatened by too much state-interference and who do not experience the 
same sensation or need to feel protected by the nation-state as their traditional, 
working class, “local” counterparts. This is something of a paradox since such 
individualism is predicated precisely on belonging to a collectivity involving 
highly complex interdependencies. Such individuals, to frame the issue boldly, 
are for the “I.” Conversely, this self-same process of individualisation can also 
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fuel the longing of members of “suppressed” minorities to acquire their own 
state; but, at a very general level, in most European states of today, the former-
ly national upper middle-class segments of yesterday have to varying degrees 
given way to a tide of urban cosmopolitanism while, simultaneously, the lower 
social echelons have, again in very general terms, been more prone to develop 
a resurgent sense of national pride (though there are significant limitations to 
this general depiction, see Dunning and Hughes in this volume). The latter are 
more for the “we.” All in all, individualistic urban cosmopolitanism is also the 
social background that might have helped to shape the very critical judgement 
of several authors famous for their contribution to the study of nations and 
nationalism (even if they are Marxist, like Hobsbawm 1990; or not, like 
Gellner 1983, Anderson 1983, and Smith 1986) who see the corresponding 
emotions as “constructed” and the nation itself as “imagined” – they dislike 
nationalism, in particular its ethno-nationalist variation, but they tend not to 
study it empirically, opting instead to condemn it as a result of the cunning of 
powerful elites. 
Of these, Anderson’s work serves as an exemplar in respect of its “cultural-
ist” treatment of nation. Such an approach involves a degree of nominalist 
discursive reductionism, where nations and nationalism are conceptually ren-
dered as little more than imaginaries, fictions, existing only in the minds of the 
individual members of any particular national group. Anderson writes: 
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never 
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in 
the minds of each lives the image of their communion. (Anderson 2006 
[1983], 15) 
Such a notion is founded, axiomatically, on the premise that relationships need 
to be directly experienced to be “real” in a material sense. Of course, to contin-
ue with Anderson’s own locutions, the idea that how nations are “imagined” is 
somehow entirely separate from the nexus of interdependencies, from the struc-
ture of how such social figurations shift and develop over time, is itself a kind 
of conceptual fiction. Elias’s term “interdependency,” and in particular “inter-
dependency chains,” can be distinguished from conventional sociological 
equivalents “interaction” or “interrelationships,” precisely because it refers to 
how members of complex social groups such as those associated with nation 
states, are bound together into figurations with people whom they might never 
meet or encounter directly, and yet with whom they are at least partially inter-
dependent in their day-to-day lives. Indeed, herein we might, historically 
speaking, be able to observe important shifts in the development of, and differ-
ences between, particular societies. For example, as Elias is able to show in On 
the Process of Civilisation, as the complexity of human figurations grows, as 
interdependency chains lengthen, as the division of social functions increases 
under the pressure of various forms of competition, so there is an increase in 
the pressure upon individuals to attune their behaviours to a greater range of 
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others, and with higher levels of foresight. This involves a shift towards regard-
ing others in more reflexive, “psychologised” ways – in turn related to process-
es of individualisation – it also involves corresponding shifts in the self-
consciousness of dominant social groups and the values, standards, and norma-
tive codes that accompany these. 
Elias’s paradigmatic theoretico-empirical cases were of the distinctive de-
velopmental paths of Germany, France, and England. Through a painstaking 
observation of historical cases in time series, Elias is able to trace different 
trajectories of development which show precisely how each nation’s emergent 
sense of itself, each nation’s distinctive set of higher order values, each nation’s 
understanding of its own lineage of development, each nation’s “affect econo-
my,” is more than simply an “imaginary,” but is rather tied in observable and 
concrete ways to the structure of the developments in the figurational nexuses 
in each empirical case. This, of course, does not mean that in each case, the 
values, narratives, normative codes, and so forth that express the self-
consciousness of particular national groups in particular historical periods are 
somehow “factual.” Indeed, characteristically, Elias suggests, they have a high 
degree of fantasy content, serving as a focus for the emotional attachments 
contained in particular nationalistic “We-Images.” They are nonetheless “real” 
in respect of their development, and also “real,” to paraphrase W.I. and D.S. 
Thomas, in their “consequences.” They contain, inter alia, the stock of behav-
ioural standards, of sources of common emotional identification and attach-
ment, the models of “selfhood,” of citizenship, of social division and prestige, 
of ethnic lineage and descendancy, the collective memories, mythologies, tri-
umphs and tragedies, and other components of “We-Imagery” from which the 
economies and alloys of identity – the “We-I” balances – are drawn, developed, 
and, to varying degrees and extents, effectively distilled into the individual 
habitudes4, the “second natures,” of the members of particular national groups. 
There are, of course components of “nationalism” and “national identity” 
that involve interested fictions. As Stuart Hall (1990; 1992; 1996) has argued, 
ideals of nation form part of a system of cultural representation, one that typi-
cally involve ideas of ethnic origin (A. D. Smith’s “ethnie”), expressive of the 
interests of powerful social groups defined in opposition to a “constitutive 
outside,” typically another ethnic social group. At the core of this system of 
representation, then, are relational struggles and contests over the narration of 
national identities and their effective adoption and identification by members of 
a nation. While Hall’s arguments in this respect are predicated once more on 
the notion of nations as primarily discursive – as cultural imaginaries a la An-
                                                             
│  
derson – they serve to highlight those aspects of national identity involving 
more conscious, and consciously interested, mythologising and fantasy-
making. Part of the issue relates to how we might distinguish between “identi-
ty” and “habitus” in this respect, and of the complex relationship between these 
concepts. We shall discuss these issues more concretely in later sections of this 
paper. 
For the moment, however, we feel bound to state that we are acutely aware 
that acknowledging national “emotions” and “habitus” presents an array of 
sociological problems, particularly since nation states are highly organised, 
multi-layered, and multi-levelled entities with plural sub-centres. Furthermore, 
in the case of emotions, a pronounced empirical difficulty relating to data-
collection and coverage is compounded by a more sociological tendency to 
accord primacy to the rational pursuit of self-interest and/or the compliance 
with norms of emotional control that lead to the hiding of affects and feelings.  
It is only under the aegis of a pluralistic political order necessitating the self-
control of the dangerous affects of hate and fear that “authoritarian rule” de-
manding obedience to commands from “above” has come to be seen as atavis-
tic. Salient expression was given to this kind of politically relevant “authoritar-
ianism” in the classical study of Adorno et al. (1950). Here, Adorno and his 
colleagues developed a concept to better understand the so-called “cyclists”-
mentality of the German “Obrigkeitsstaat” (nach oben buckeln, nach unten 
treten) and was, then, adopted for the social-psychological analysis of quite 
different social conditions in post-war California (California F-scale of the 
“authoritarian personality”). This research instrument was designed to measure 
attitudes presumed to be associated with communist thinking, and so facilitate 
the so-called “McCarthy witch-hunt,” although, of course, the respective histo-
ries of Wilhelmine Germany and Tocqueville’s democratic, state-adverse 
America differed in many respects. 
The title for this Special Issue contains the term “national character,” which 
was chosen because it invokes more familiar connotations than the term “na-
tional habitus.” Here, however, we must draw an important distinction. The 
expression “national habitus” is employed here only as a scientific-technical 
term. While it might overlap with “national character” in certain respects, it is 
intended to be used in ways that avoid the associations with that phrase, partic-
ularly as it has been used by nationalistic groups that aim at a certain praxis and 
identity-politics. “National character” encompasses a complex array of quite 
different meanings varying in multiple contexts of usage. First, “national char-
acter” can mean that all members of a certain ethnic group –“people” (in Ger-
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man “Volk”) – or a certain nation share the same physical and/or mental char-
acteristics. Second, it can be used to define a “nation” or even nations in the 
plural as specific entities without referring to the qualities of individuals as 
members of a “nation.” It rather points to an abstract whole according to which 
there is the nationalist’s belief of a distinct quality compared with other “na-
tions.” Sometimes, the expression “national spirit” is also used in a similar 
way. Quite in contrast to the nationalist’s terminology, the concept of national 
habitus refers neither to an abstract, essentialist, and unchanging, timeless 
substance of mythical blood-ties nor the mental or physical characteristic of all 
members of a “nation.” Both sets of connotations – that such commonalities are 
fixed and are shared by all – are problematic in respect of their determinism 
and statism. In order to avoid too static notions, for present purposes it is more 
adequate to use such terms of “national habitus formation” or “habitualisation” 
in order to orient thinking towards conceiving always of social processes when 
we use the term “habitus.” 
It is only under specific circumstances that the social habitus of a group can 
form the basis for a “national habitus.” The term “habitus,” now frequently 
associated with the work of Pierre Bourdieu, was used by sociologists many 
decades before him (Elias among them) and has a history of usage that runs 
back to Thomas Aquinas and further to Aristotle’s distinction of “hexis,” refer-
ring to the observable aspect of behaviour, and “dispositio,” related to the 
“soul” (Rehbein and Saalmann 2009). At the most basic level, Elias’s usage of 
the term refers simultaneously to embodied social learning and self-experience: 
the everyday locution “second nature” comes closest to capturing core aspects 
of its meaning. A paradigmatic example for Elias (2012a) was the transfor-
mation of warriors into courtiers in the French civilising process, later com-
plemented in Elias’s writing by its English counterpart of parliamentarisation 
processes involving the transformation of warriors into “gentlemen.” Central to 
these examples is the idea that a simultaneously “psychic” and “social” habitus 
is formed when human beings experience their emotions or “affects” as shaped 
in particular ways through the necessities of the social conditions under which 
they are developed. Elias’s principal methodological conviction was to accord 
analytical primacy to process over structure; later stages in social development 
can only be properly understood by referring to their earlier phases. Elias 
stressed – like Max Weber – the importance of understanding particular histor-
ical processes as specific developments even if they result in effects on a global 
scale. In tandem with this orientation, Elias’s emphasis was upon the need to 
develop theoretical concepts according to the explanatory riddle researchers 
want to use these to address. 
The meaning of the concept of national habitus is, therefore, closely related 
to the problem of understanding certain “state” or “class” habitus. This is the 
case because it is only through the consideration of the process of state-
building (as a particular kind of “survival-unit”) that the concept of national 
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habitus makes any sense. Above all, “national habitus” can only be heuristical-
ly useful if treated as an instrument of comparative-historical research. In such 
a context only, it helps to contrast and compare characteristics of comparable 
social formations in different state-societies. Examples are state-elites, aristo-
crats, army-officers, senior civil servants, and so forth who are regarded by 
others – and above all, by themselves – as members of “good society.” These 
individuals are the bearers of distinctive standards of manners, speaking, and 
fashion and are models of self-control and self-expression: they typically sym-
bolise the highest levels of status and distinctiveness within a nation. 
Such standards and behaviours can be studied comparatively and historically 
since the levels of the dissemination of standards of socially desirable behav-
iour, or perhaps better, the imitation of manners of “good society,” differs 
between state-societies. There is typically a process of “social closure” in-
volved in the demarcations between such social groups with modes of exclu-
sion developed by established groups in order to omit rising new formations of 
people seeking to participate as power holders. It is the length and the intensity 
of chains of interdependencies which also trigger emotions of belonging or 
being excluded from “good society.” The processes by which behavioural 
standards were developed, and the gradual changes in how such standards and 
normative codes came to be expressed, has been documented at length both by 
Elias and Cas Wouters (1999; Wouters and Dunning 2019) in their discussions 
of “formalisation” and “informalisation.” Indeed, the balance of processes of 
formalisation and informalisation in socially prevailing behavioural standards 
varies considerably such that differences in the national habitus between state-
societies can also be examined through a comparative consideration of the 
concept of the “formality and informality span of a society” (Elias 2013 
[1989]). 
Following Elias, it makes sense to distinguish two types of social institu-
tions shaping national habitus: first, there are central power-institutions coining 
the habitus of elites (Prägeanstalten), like the royal court, the state administra-
tion and bureaucracy, Parliament, the army, elite schools and universities, or 
student fraternities. Second, we find institutions shaping the routines and the 
infrastructure of everyday life for larger parts of the population. Traffic has to 
be organised, markets, offices, schools and factories have to be institutionalised 
and controlled. Much of it may be quite standardised under social conditions 
characterised by global interdependency chains, nonetheless differences in 
“national” habitus between certain countries exist. 
There is, thus, not only one singular national habitus. Indeed, there are al-
ways several established groups and outsider groups (Elias and Scotson 2008) 
of different kinds and formations within any particular national grouping. Elias 
contrasts the complex interplay of “group charisma” and “group disgrace” in 
the unfolding characteristics of members of different status-groups interrelated 
to each other and forming a certain figuration. The mechanisms may differ 
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from state to state with their special path-dependencies of state-formation. For 
instance, through the compound of geography and certain contingent social and 
political constellations, the role of the navy or the army may be more important 
in one country than in another (as Elias demonstrated through comparing the 
English case with that of absolutist regimes on the continent). These constella-
tions also helped certain social formations to gain power-positions more easily 
in one country than in the other.  
In sociological objections to the concept of habitus, there are at least five coun-
ter-positions: a) emphasis on “situations,” b) the concept of “discourse,” c) the 
unclear relationship between habitus and identity, d) the methodological prob-
lem of empirical (historical) sources, and e) normative resentment against the 
idea of a “national” habitus. We should like to consider each in turn as a means 
of further advancing the conception of national habitus. 
In relation to a), there are approaches that attribute all explanatory power to 
the “situation,” be it fluent or bureaucratically stable, and not to the “person” 
and personality “traits.” Examples can be found in the sociology of violent 
emotions derived from symbolic interactionism (Collins 2008) or in Weberian 
ideal type models of state bureaucracy that are attributed to the creation of 
modern mass-violence (Malešević 2006). In Collins’s theory of violence, for 
instance, there is no room for an explanation that focuses on a socially shaped 
“habitus,” nor for that matter, any “national habitus.” What Elias had called 
“constraints by others” (Fremdzwänge), has become instead rendered as the 
“situation” that is more or less the only causal agent responsible for the occur-
rence of physical violence. It is, to follow this line of reasoning, highly unlikely 
that we will be killed by a barber in a barber-shop. Even murderers do not kill 
all the time, but only in certain situations. There is evident truth in this finding 
– it may only appear trivial in many cases. But it is not banal in some other 
instances where the situation has originally been overlooked and can be identi-
fied as causally relevant – for instance, an aggressive nationalism may more 
often occur in a situation of major threats from outside the nation. Indeed, more 
stable behavioural patterns are dependent as much on the stability of social 
institutions as the stability of internalised traits. And yet, the non-trivial ele-
ment of such an explanation will often be lost through the situational focus – 
that differences in habitus can generate a certain, distinguishable pattern in 
otherwise identical or at least similar situations. The idea of positing a genealo-
gy of social processes, stretching over generations or centuries, and presenting 
this at the core of analysis is totally alien to Collins. Although he is not general-
ly against macro-explanations, he employs a hierarchy of explanation which 
accords primacy to a focus on “situations” first. This implies that the meaning 
of a situation for an actor can somehow be separated from the larger “context,” 
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and should be open to direct empirical observation involving a focus on the 
individual.  
The main advantage of Collins’s description of situational violence is its 
empirical detail and its ability to accommodate complex, often contradictory 
logics. But this need not be lost if we incorporate into our analyses the affective 
experiences from previous “situations” that have, to varying degrees, become 
sedimented into a “habitus.” Just as these “situations” are constituted relation-
ally in space (through, for example, a division of labour), so they are processu-
ally: in time. Ignoring the processual dynamics of “situations” means neglect-
ing what people carry with them into “situations” – the lessons learned from 
received histories; the implicit orientations, rules, and feelings towards others 
that flow from generations before them; the unnoticed affective consequences 
of collective pride, humiliation, triumphalism, injury, anger, superiority, etc. 
woven into the blame and praise narratives of popular historical record. A 
situationalist emphasis leads us to ignore how such feelings and modes of relat-
ing can become distilled into the psyche of those whose collective interaction 
comprises “the situation” – a problem experientially compounded by a central 
characteristic of social habitus: that, in the main, much of it defies conscious 
interpretation and awareness by social actors. 
The focus on “situation” has also become central for the critique of “pri-
mordial” interpretations of national identities. Heather (2009) for example, 
advances an analysis of empire that challenges the assumption of unchanged 
group-loyalties since the barbarian “invasions” in late-Roman antiquity. Loyal-
ties vary, following authors such as Barth or Leach cited by Heather, according 
to situations and, therefore, cannot constitute a habitualised basis for national 
identity. In particular, Heather stresses the push-and-pull factors of migration 
that have led to quite accidental coalitions and strategies of ethnically highly 
divergent Germanic or Slavic groups, so demonstrating how ethnogenesis is 
situationally fluid and open. While the accidental formation of tribes are cer-
tainly worthwhile historical cases to consider, such developments by no means 
obviate the possibility of more enduring social nexuses and their persistence 
over time: the millennial spans of, for instance, Bavarians, Scots, or Catalans 
with distinctive languages. How is it that, say, the languages of such groups 
could not preserve certain characteristics shared by members of the related 
cultures? Indeed, as Elias has argued, language, while itself part and parcel of 
unfolding social processes, can serve as an important layer of the “onion” of 
national habitus. 
b) A second group of counter-positions involves approaches which prefer to 
talk of “discourse” (Leerssen 2000; Howarth and Torfing 2005) rather than of 
“habitus,” since this permits an avoidance of penetrating beyond discursive 
contests and discursively fought social conflicts between social classes, inter-
est-groups, and/or conflicts related to gender. Such approaches entail objec-
tions to the notion of a relatively enduring, “second-nature” type of personality 
│  
and habitus, stressing instead the fluidity of social conditions – that these might 
be, or should be, open to change, at best, open to permanent change for the 
“better” (and here such evaluations are typically based on normative frame-
works centring around emancipatory politics). Here short-term political will is 
privileged above ontological adequacy such as in the case of certain positions 
in the sociology of migration which eschew the notion of “ingrained habitus” 
as avoidable cultural racism, or, for instance, positions relating to the sociology 
of the family where the focus on gender wilfully ignores the role of social 
habitus since its accommodation could entail a quasi-biological justification for 
sustaining the status quo of patriarchal dominance. The logical companion of 
such views is a kind of revolutionary voluntarism, an exemplar of which can be 
found in the work of the post-Marxist thinker Castoriadis (1984). An important 
consideration in this connection is whether “discourse” refers to patterns of 
discussions and arguments put forward quite overtly with a clear rational inten-
tion, or if such discourses refer instead to certain habits, following customs and 
practices of how to speak and what to speak, albeit that these are not reflected 
consciously.  
c) A third set of objections, similar to those which favour an engagement 
with “discourse,” relate to the distinctions between “habitus” and “identity” 
with respect to degrees of individual reflection and consciousness. Of central 
importance here is the notion that habitus contains mainly unconscious, semi-
conscious, or automatic aspects (we refer back to our earlier discussion of 
Hall). To the degree that individuals can start to become aware of those charac-
teristics and bring them into attention, they will become more amenable to 
control and manipulation. Hence, the concept of (national) habitus is problema-
tised when one conceives it instead as those aspects of identity which, as yet, 
have remained beyond the purview of individual self-reflection. Under the 
conditions of a relatively high degree of self-reflection and attention, questions 
about “who am I?,” “who are we?,” and “who belongs to my group and who 
does not?” can be understood to be synonymous with uncovering the normative 
codes enshrined in habitualised orientations in thinking and feeling.  
It would, indeed, be misleading to understand “national identity” as some-
thing outside individual thinking and feeling. Malešević (2006) or Brubaker 
(1996) are right by warning that those conceptualisations of “national identity” 
may likely lead to reifying the term. However, it is also misleading to under-
stand “national identity” as a stable “attitude” that can be researched without 
regard for the specific context in which it is formed. It would furthermore be 
misleading to understand processes of identification and de-habitualisation as 
only the task of isolated individuals. Instead, in most cases, reflection is em-
bedded in a social “organisation of reflection.” Reflecting is not only an indi-
vidual, but mostly a collective process. It may be the case that dramatic chang-
es foster in individuals a sense of greater awareness and restlessness. The 
answers to such discomforts, however, will typically be collectively organised 
│  
(as in the case of organised nationalism), characteristically adopting the form of 
prefabricated we-images and social ideals. In this way, we might consider how 
such facets of identity are related to identity politics, ideologies, and utopian 
world-views. 
It is thus important to be aware that “habitus” and “identity” respectively re-
fer to different aspects of each other. They might fruitfully be conceptualised as 
oppositions to each other in respect of the degree of reflection and conscious-
ness. “Habitus” – as a concept of practice – always involves a certain degree 
and level of reflection which is necessary for the successful performance of 
everyday routines. Conversely, what one calls “identity” will also often include 
areas beyond strict awareness or consciousness. Habitualised and internalised 
aspects of thinking, feeling, and bodily features are relatively more related to 
unconsciousness and semi-consciousness, whereas mental processes of identi-
fication become relatively stronger along with reflection. In this sense, process-
es of identification always involve simultaneous processes of de-
habitualisation. 
Following this argument, it becomes clear that process sociology does not 
lead to a deterministic point of view which only focuses on “habitus” as the 
unconscious internalisation of “society.” Elias himself always promoted the 
notion of dynamic inner tensions between those forces leading to habitualisa-
tion and routinisation and individual will and striving, with the latter irreduci-
ble to the forces of social environment. 
d) A fourth set of objections is rather more source-oriented. Such positions 
suggest any claims about “habitus” must be predicated on the discovery of 
certain kinds of data such as, for instance, official files and documents (Lorenz 
1997; Goldthorpe 1991; and Goldthorpe 2007 specifically against Bourdieu 
and the notion of cultural capital and habitus). If we follow the methodological 
advice of quantitatively-oriented social historians like Peter Laslett (1976), who 
dismisses all attempts to gain information from literary sources (which are 
more suited than others to give notice of emotions) as systematically unreliable, 
we are left with a huge void when it comes to analysing the development of 
something like a “national habitus.”  
The solution to this dilemma, and the answer to this objection, demands two 
inter-related steps – one consists in the careful analysis of the pragmatic con-
text in which “soft,” qualitative data were produced (etiquette books, novels, 
films); the other is the formation of theoretical syntheses and models that can-
not be simply mapped to isolated measurement. Again, the work of Elias serves 
as an exemplar in these respects. 
e) Finally, a fifth counter-position is aimed less at the idea of habitus itself 
(particularly since, a class-centric notion of “cultural habitus” à la Bourdieu 
has generally been met with broad sociological consent), but strongly opposes 
the notion of a national or state-based habitus. Many do not want to follow this 
idea because they regard it as the mere expression of a prejudice with the aim 
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of glorification or degradation. The line of critique insists instead upon varia-
bility: in all state-societies there are counter-examples; if we attribute to mem-
bers of one particular nation a special “assertiveness,” you will also regularly 
find at least one person who incorporates the perfect antipode (Robins 2005; 
Terracciano et al. 2005). Against this position, Inkeles and Levinson (2014) 
have already argued for the studying of “modal personality” as being shaped by 
cultural systems in a stochastic manner; and following Elias, the affective expe-
rience of humans in specific “mints” can never be explained by looking at the 
individual alone. What we need is a theoretical model of the whole, and this is 
culturally specific. Added to these criticisms is the dominant sociological atti-
tude of the last four or five decades that claims the nation-state to be an obso-
lescent unit of history and treating it thus as an atavism (Hoffmann 1966; 
Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 1990; and more recently Habermas 2011). Such 
sentiments have found further nourishment both by a moral-entrepreneurial 
variant of cosmopolitan enlightenment and a neoliberal milieu oriented towards 
fostering economic globalisation. For these theorists, diverse as their political 
orientation might be, a national identity anchored in a kind of “habitus,” is – or 
should be – rather weak, the more so, as such authors stress what they prefer to 
posit as “identity” as a reflexive project (for instance, as conceived in Giddens 
1991). 
The articles selected for this issue cover a broad range both geographically and 
in their emphasis on current problems nation-states face externally (referring to 
their embedding in systems of states under the auspices of globalisation, mar-
ketisation and European unification) and internally (referring to the develop-
ment of inner-state power balances between classes – ruling elites and broader 
strata – and ethnic groups, in particular between indigenous majorities and 
recently arrived migrants). Geographically, the areas considered stretch from 
the Middle East (Gad Yair on Israel, Behrouz Alikhani on Iran, Onur Kḯnlḯ and 
İrem Özgören Kḯnlḯ on Turkey), South-Eastern Europe (Nicolas Demertzis and 
Hara Stratoudaki on Greece) through Western and Central Europe (Lars Bo 
Kaspersen on Denmark, Dieter Reicher on Germany) and the British Isles 
(Steven Loyal and Stephen Quilley on Ireland; Michael Dunning and Jason 
Hughes on the UK) to Northern America (Stephen Mennell on the US) on the 
one hand, and from Eastern Central Europe (Miklós Hadas on Hungary, Marta 
Bucholc on Poland) to the Far East, Japan (Akira Ohira) on the other. The 
historical depth of sociological analysis and length of period under scrutiny 
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differs for more than a millennium (Turkey, the Middle East) in the case of 
ancient centres of civilisation (to which Japan certainly also belongs) to the 
latest two centuries and, in particular, the decades since the Second World War 
in the case of Ireland, Denmark, and the US. In terms of the development of the 
system of modern states and their geopolitical entanglement, the focus is on the 
hegemonial, formally democratic power of the West, the US; on the former 
contenders and early parliamentarian states of Britain relative to the less demo-
cratic and partly Eastern absolutist, formerly Prussian-dominated Germany. 
The analyses presented in this Special Issue also consider states located at the 
fringes of the European system of great powers, like Ottoman Turkey, formerly 
Habsburg Hungary, and semi-peripheral new nation-states like Greece and 
Poland that owe their re-appearance to the collapse of multi-ethnic empires in a 
manner similar to the successor-states of the ancient civilisations of Mesopo-
tamia and Iran. These latter states, and also modern Turkey, can be seen as 
hybrids of the Islamic “Orient” in Said’s sense and the Western European mod-
el of the nation state, as mediated through a Romantic German historicism 
stressing the language and culture of a heroic past. The particular historical 
situation and circumstances that gave rise to the birth of Israel, also a new 
nation-state as the non-intentional offspring of European nationalism, form a 
separate case – here, the emphasis is laid upon the fraught relationship to Ger-
many, a place where a civilisational catastrophe of huge proportions has still 
left traces in the memory both of the children of victims and of perpetrators 
alike. 
Contributions to this special issue deal, inter alia, with: 
- (a) Currently visible state-generated emotions, among them, in particular, 
nationalistic we-feelings towards members of the “own” survival-unit 
and equally nationalistic they-feelings against members of other states or 
minorities of their own state; 
- (b) State-generated forms of social habitus (often subsumed under the 
heading of “national character”), in which emotions are shaped by insti-
tutions in long-term processes (typically lasting at least three genera-
tions);  
- (c) Those aspects of national character that can be called “authoritarian” 
– not only or primarily referring to the submissive and respectful behav-
iour towards persons of senior rank or age, but rather to the tendency to 
prefer strong leaders over the often troubling and bureaucratically com-
plex procedures characteristic for parliamentarian societies and their ritu-
als for a peaceful change of political power. In particular, in some of the 
state societies scrutinised here – Hungary, Poland, Turkey, and the Mid-
dle East – it is not only rule by parliament that can be seen in danger but 
also the rule of law. 
It is important to have in mind that the pragmatic context of explanations need-
ed for the analysis of societies as diverse as they are assembled here has serious 
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consequences for the formation of concepts like “nation,” “national habitus,” or 
“authority” because the related problems differ too. It makes a huge difference 
whether a nation-state has originally developed from the previous stage of a 
dynastic state, when the dominant ethnically or at least linguistically definable 
population group takes control from their aristocratic overlords and starts to see 
itself as a “nation,” or when, by contrast, the nation is radically formed from 
splinters of multinational empires that have lost in state-competition, possibly 
through wars. In this respect, the difference between a state like Denmark that 
has had ample time to develop its institutions, and a state like modern Iran that 
has relatively recently become reconstituted from remnants of old empires is 
huge. No simplistic or law-like notion of “nation” can suffice to accommodate 
the complexity of highly divergent, individually shaped forms of “survival 
units” within their specific contexts. In a similar way, the ethnic or religious 
pillar of state-hood (cf. Smith 1986) will also vary greatly – from Greek ortho-
dox or Polish Catholic heritage to religiously undefined Denmark or from 
Celtic Ireland to the “Melting Pot” of the US. Equally important is the context 
in which nation-states are embedded – from the EU-point of view, no national-
ism is entirely harmless and every single one is potentially dangerous: from 
Scotland or Catalonia, such nationalities are the object of long-lasting desire. 
From the perspective of a modern welfare-state, the focus shifts according to 
the interests and sentiments of (cosmopolitan) elites and (local) lower strata. In 
the case of a national “habitus,” this will be shaped by various layers corre-
sponding to historically and processually definable stages of survival-units: 
some quite far from the contested present of Greece, Turkey, Hungary, or Po-
land, where the affiliation to the former composite-state might have had more 
shaping power than the still fresh existence as independent nation-state. In this 
respect, we-feelings and habitus can have little in common. 
A number of distinct themes mark the distinctive contributions to this Spe-
cial Issue: 
 
1. States and Emotion: Reactions to the threat from outside. We-feelings, na-
tionalism, and supra-national associations – US, Israel, Poland, Ireland, Den-
mark, and Britain. 
As a closer look at the papers of this volume under the aegis of “emotion” 
shows, it is not easy or even useful to separate “emotions” from “habitus.” We 
can, nevertheless, classify contributions according to the emphasis they have 
placed on either the short-term or the long-term aspects of the respective 
formative processes. The papers of Yair on Israeli-German scientific collabora-
tion, of Bucholc on Polish resentment against Europe, and of Mennell on the 
superiority-complex of the US are perfect examples of the relevance of strong 
emotions for the interaction between members of different nation-states em-
bedded in state-systems. Yair describes the deep sense of uneasiness that be-
falls Israeli scientists cooperating successfully with their German counterparts 
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when they visit them in their homes or experience them in non-professional 
everyday interaction. Bucholc reminds us of the Polish anxiety turning illiberal 
in the face of a troubling neighbourhood of European states with a colonising 
past. Mennell’s paper deals with the unconscious arrogance that many US-
citizens demonstrate towards the rest of the world. All three articles develop a 
processual perspective and see the actually experienced emotions as, in part, 
the produce of specific “mints” coining distinctive affective households (i.e., 
“habitus”). A nationalism with excluding traits against migrants is also de-
scribed in two papers on Western state-societies – Loyal and Quilley’s on Ire-
land and Kaspersen’s on Denmark. In both cases it is the welfare state, created 
for indigenous nationals (formerly suppressed in Ireland, suffering a uniting 
defeat from Prussia in the case of Denmark), that denies access to ethnically 
diverse immigrants, engenders emotions of hostility towards foreigners, and 
contributes to the collapse of solidarity in Europe in face of the great migra-
tion-boom of 2015. Finally, Dunning and Hughes critically evaluate recent 
sociological explanations for the vote for a British exit from the EU or “Brex-
it,” in particular those which seek to explain this in terms of the political, eco-
nomic, and social abandonment of the white working class. Dunning and 
Hughes instead advance a longer-term analysis, linking the rift in British socie-
ty over the vote to Leave or Remain as based upon a much longer-term set of 
processes involving a distinctively British tension in the duality of normative 
codes. 
 
2. State development and national habitus: Germany, Japan, Turkey, Greece, 
and Iran 
A further category of contributions to this Special Issue refers to (national) 
habitus in a more indirect way and link its explanation to its long-term histori-
cal genesis. Reicher’s and Ahira’s papers deal with the development of a sport-
related habitus in Germany with respect to Japan; both try to place it in the 
context of Western rivalry and influences. Kḯnlḯ and Kḯnlḯ stress the warrior-
element of contemporary Turkish national habitus and its formation through a 
long period from the nomadic culture of the Steppe to the creation of a modern 
nation-state following European models. Demertzis and Stratoudaki deal with 
the complex relationship between ascribed they-images of Greek character 
from outside (shifting between the Byzantine and the Hellenistic stereotype) 
and the self-image of the Greeks as it has developed under the simultaneous 
influence of Western perceptions and Greek internal conflicts between state, 
elites, and masses. Alikhani points to the centuries of nomadic conquest of 
Persia and the inability to develop internal pacification via a legitimate state-
monopoly of violence as a main, habitualised obstacle both to economic mod-
ernisation and to democratisation. 
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3. State and Authoritarianism: Feelings attached to internal processes and 
social movements – democratisation and parliamentarisation: Hungary 
There are several contributions to this volume that focus on political authoritar-
ianism, but avoid such simplistic generalisations and try to separate analytically 
between historically founded attitudes towards the state and the complex and 
situated emotions towards minorities either coming from outside or forming an 
ethnic group within the state. Hadas’s analysis of Hungarian history of feudal 
rule and exploitation of rural masses, broken by massive, mostly catastrophic 
challenges from outside (Turkish and Habsburg conquest, defeat in the First 
World War, suffered by the Entente powers, German Nazism, and Soviet 
communism) and lacking a stable continuity of town-based middle classes, 
outlines an explanation for the contemporary backlash to political authoritari-
anism and to a xenophobic consensus hostile to minorities.  
The contributions to this volume share the influence of Elias, most employ-
ing his insights as central to their analyses, with the exceptions of Yair (on the 
Israeli-German relationship) and Demertzis and Stratoudakis (on stereotypes of 
Greek national character). Common to all contributions is an extension of con-
cepts of national we-feelings, we-I-balances, we-identities, we-images, and 
habitus to the explanatory context of present social problems and conflicts 
related to Europeanisation, globalisation, state-competition, and the political 
order within states (democratisation); and, as such, each attempts to avoid the 
dangers of essentialism. Nonetheless, contributors have developed their own, 
often highly original, interpretations of Eliasian concepts and have placed their 
emphasis accordingly on various aspects of them. It is worth identifying the 
most important points of creative divergence. 
While most papers assembled here converge in the use of key concepts, they 
also differ in their understanding in some relevant points: 
a) They find different solutions for the relationship between “discourse” as a 
politically fluent category and “habitus” as something relatively fixed. At the 
core of such divergence are different workings through of the relationship 
between a cognitively shared conscious sense of national identity, identity 
politics (attempts to influence national identity deliberately in the interest of 
some groups, by means of discourse, persuasion, or coercion), and a partly 
unconscious national habitus (or conflicting versions of national habitus).  
b) The approaches collected here also vary according to the emphasis they 
put on the primordial versus constructed character of nations and/or other sur-
vival units that might have either preceded or followed them. In particular, this 
has implications for the role of language as a constituting element of nation-
hood. 
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c) Another key point of divergence relates to whether national habitus some-
thing is best understood as ceteris paribus the habitus of an elite, trickling 
down the social ladder, or whether it also comprises ascendant behavioural 
models of lower social classes. Such issues, in turn, relate to how the concept 
of a state-shaped habitus might be reconciled with the multiple layers of mod-
ern state-apparatuses. For instance, it is possible to elucidate and reconstruct 
the rise and failure of a Habsburg military habitus (Kuzmics and Haring 2013), 
culminating in defeat in the First World War, but the question remains concern-
ing the extent to which this Austrian state-habitus also permeated the behaviour 
of the common foot-soldier, the officer-class, the commanders, or even in the 
central war-bureaucracy located far away in Vienna. The question of where and 
how any particular state habitus is formed, the degree to which it is pervasive, 
remains an open one. The papers of this volume vary in their approaches in this 
regard, too. 
d) Contributors also differ in their emphasis on individual or on collective 
identities; the “We-I-balance.” If we treat “identity” as “self-identity,” we place 
more weight on the individual than on the group, whereas the notion of a “na-
tional identity” strengthens the role of the group. A we-identity might be bal-
anced more towards the one side than the other under particular social condi-
tions – migrants who leave their nation, cosmopolitans with two or more 
passports – they all might hold the “I”-aspect of their identity as being more 
relevant than the “we,” and the “we” component may involve multiple, com-
plex layers and potential contradictions; simultaneously, their sense of “I” may 
be in flux, emergent, alloyed in different ways to new relational nexuses whilst 
anchored firmly in others. The contributions to this volume differ also in this 
respect. 
e) Referring to the complex relationship between social memory, which is 
typically highly selective, and the case of different national habitus and identi-
ties, the contributions to this volume differ in important respects. In some cas-
es, remembering is understood as an explicit/active process, allowing for delib-
erate decisions; as in b) emphasis varies between a more primordialist or a 
more constructivist notion of “survival units” like tribe or nation. In others, 
remembering is posited in a more implicit/passive manner: mediated through 
school education, organised nationalism, and state-institutions.  
 
a) Habitus versus Discourse 
Several papers approach “national habitus” as a socially shaped “affective 
household” (close to the Eliasian understanding) with a long duration of devel-
opment, to a degree independent of discursive, fluid circumstances which 
might change it at any particular time. For instance, Kḯnlḯ and Kḯnlḯ see the 
“warrior element” of a Turkish national habitus, in spite of all discursive influ-
ences from the West or the interests of competing political factions within the 
survival unit (from Ottoman Empire to Turkey as a nation state), as a consistent 
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trait. In a similar way, Alikhani stresses the enduring formative shaping power 
of geopolitics on Iran, and Mennell, likewise, presents a similar account of the 
constitution of an American habitus of perceived superiority over the rest of the 
world as rooted in their fortunes in major wars, both bloody and economic 
ones. On the other end of the spectrum, Demertzis and Stratoudakis see the 
notion of a Greek habitus shifting not only as a result of historical circumstanc-
es and “mints” with the power to shape personalities, but also as refracted 
through the lens of foreigners and their discursive passions as expressing vari-
ously either oriental, “Byzantine,” or classically Western “Greek-Hellenic” 
qualities. While these perceptions also influence Greek self-images as auto-
stereotypes, both are open to interests and can be mobilised discursively ac-
cording to politics. 
As we have touched upon earlier in this paper, these differences pivot on the 
problem of conceptualising the relationship between habitus and identity. Giv-
en that “identity” typically is used to refer to more consciously reflected we-
images and we-ideals, there are two distinct possibilities of how to relate the 
two notions. In the first, national we-images and we-ideals are conceived as 
being principally the product of discursive phantasy, capturing little of the 
“real” habitus of the population they pretend to reflect (as in Hobsbawm’s and 
Ranger’s [1983] idea of “invented traditions,” intentionally and deliberately 
fabricated, as an “opium for the people”). In the second, national we-images 
and we-ideals are seen to grasp aspects of the real culture and habitus, albeit in 
highly distorted, but nonetheless partly realistic, images of a national we-group, 
with competing versions of “national identity,” some of these being more con-
cretely ideological than others. Following Mannheim (1997 [1936]), both a 
“total” ideology and a “utopian” consciousness can be distinguished – the 
former supporting the existing political order, as in the “banal nationalism” 
(Billig 1995) of daily TV-weather reports with maps and national flags in front 
of official buildings; the latter, “utopian” variant promoting social action to 
change “reality,” through activities of organised nationalism. Our contributions 
vary with respect to the emphasis they put on their analyses of the conservative 
or “utopian” elements of national ideologies. 
 
b) Primordial versus Constructed 
The articles of this volume differ also in the degree to which they attribute to 
the nation-state a so-called “primordial” character, as a community of blood, 
kin, language, or “fate” (a Schicksalsgemeinschaft), or rather more a “con-
structed” character – a product of modernity and/or as a Willensnation that 
might change its attitude in daily plebiscites. Ohira’s study of a formerly exclu-
sively Japanese “sport” that has come to transgress Japan’s contemporary bor-
ders is situated more towards the primordial end of this division, while the 
contributions of Alikhani (stressing the manifold tribes and empire-traditions of 
Iran) and Kḯnlḯ and Kḯnlḯ (a Turkish nation yet to be formed out of the multi-
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national Ottoman empire) tend to its other, more “constructionist” pole. Some 
authors acknowledge the role played by language (Demertzis and Stratoudaki 
on Greece) and religion (Bucholc on Poland, Loyal and Quilley on Ireland, and 
again Demertzis and Stratoudaki on the role of Greek Orthodox Church). The 
language-issue is certainly not central to the demarcation of the US from other 
English-speaking states as Britain, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand. It is 
also scarcely problematised (indeed rather taken as evident) in the case of 
Denmark (Kaspersen), Hungary (Hadas), and Germany (Reicher). 
 
c) Elites versus Masses 
We might also classify the contributions to this volume according to their dif-
ferent emphases on the social locus of the “mint” that shapes national or state-
related habitus – whether habitus is modelled more in and for elites (as in Eli-
as’s courtly France) or lower down the social ladder. Such issues also extend to 
whether national habitus is developed firstly as an elite-habitus, and if so 
whether this form of habitus is understood to “trickle down” from the nobility 
to the working bourgeois, through to lower social strata. Conversely, these 
issues relate to the role, or potential role, of “trickle up” effects: whether and 
how a lower-class habitus also started to shape the behavioural standards of the 
upper-classes. Such questions are extremely difficult to address empirically 
and, in most of the cases presented, the issues remain implicit. The answers 
depend in part upon the explanatory context for which the assumption of a 
habitus is useful (in understanding obstacles to democratic rule, attitudes to-
wards supra-national federations, the behaviour towards migrants, and so on), 
but also upon what is perceived as that layer of a stratified survival-unit that is 
most relevant for its “survival.”  
For Hungary, Hadas stresses the importance of the “gentry” and nobility in 
forming a specific ideal of masculinity which trickles down to the masses, 
although under extremely discontinuous political conditions. In the case of 
Greece, Demertzis and Stratoudaki refer to the long-term dependence of the 
Greek lower and middle-classes on their Ottoman rulers. In a similar manner, 
Loyal and Quilley and Bucholc discuss the emancipation of the rural masses 
from their (English, German, Russian) masters and they do not refer to upper-
class models. In the case of the US, Mennell focuses on the formative elite 
experience of dominance over all other nations, an attitude which has been 
plausibly also transferred to the broader masses who enjoy their high “global” 
rank (via Hollywood’s film industry or other socialising agents like schools and 
sport events in which the cult of the American flag is only one visible expres-
sion of deep seated we-feelings) and incorporate this into their own I-identity 
and self-esteem. Again, the diverse range of empirical cases considered offers a 




d) We or I? 
The collective level (here, of the survival unit of the nation-state) creates one 
pole of emotions and habitus, the individual, personal level of experience, the 
other. Nowhere is the individual fully consumed by group-membership. Every 
human being lives in fluctuating we-I-balances, from family, kin, village, or 
town to tribe, nation, or even mankind. Very often, group-ties to units of a 
lower level can become loose only when membership to units of a higher level 
(state versus family) replace the survival-function of the unit at a lower level. 
Therefore, the paradox exists that a higher degree of individualisation goes 
hand in hand with a higher level of group-membership (since, as Georg Simmel 
has already noticed, dependence on many means that dependence on only one 
specific group or individual is reduced, thus giving room for individual free-
dom, which he saw guaranteed by the disposal of money). Elias once referred 
to this companion of individualisation as the “gestiegene Impermanenz von 
Wir-Gruppen-Beziehungen” (“greater impermanence of we-relationships”). In 
the case of we-feelings towards the nation-state, there is also always the possi-
bility that individual interests (not paying taxes, migration to other countries, 
refusing to serve in the army), ego-centred emotions (sometimes dismissively 
called “narcissism”), and the habitus of homo clausus prevail over the com-
mitment to state or nation and the emotions related to deep altruism. However, 
as we have argued above, following Elias,  
The possibility that human beings may experience love for a group to which 
they themselves as well as others belong is one of the many instances which 
show that a simple polarity between feelings of self-regard and of regard for 
others, of egotism and altruism, or even of good and bad, may not always fit 
the observable evidence. (Elias 2007 [1983], 9) 
The contributions collected here place different emphasis on either the “We” or 
the “I” of the respective balance. Japan (Ohira), Turkey (Kḯnlḯ and Kḯnlḯ), Po-
land (Bucholc), and Israel (Yair) tend to the first direction, while Denmark 
(Kaspersen), Ireland (Loyal and Quilley), and Germany (Reicher) rather to the 
other, with most other cases being somewhere in between. 
 
e) Memory and/or habitus 
There is a delicate balance between the concepts of “social memory” and “so-
cial habitus.” In collective remembrance, in particular of nations or states, the 
element of active, deliberate selection typically dominates over the unplanned, 
non-intentional imprint of former experiences. In collective forms of common-
ly shared habitus, the element of the unconscious has more weight than reflex-
ive awareness. “Memory,” in this explicit sense, can thus be more easily 
steered towards a certain direction than “habitus” – a famous example is the 
Kosovo-myth of the Serbs in which remembrance of the battle between Christ 
and Devil in the year 1389 is still a highly selective topic of Serbian memory, 
celebrating Serbian sacrifice against European forgetfulness. In contrast, most 
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Austrians will not even recognise that their “affective household” was formed 
through centuries of feudal, clerical, patrimonial, and bureaucratic authority, a 
set of long-term processes which find expression in the characteristic of deep 
resentment against anyone who is self-assured to the point of arrogance, impu-
dence, and insolence (a set of traits often seen, albeit erroneously, in German 
nationals). The papers assembled here differ markedly in this respect. In partic-
ular, Yair (for Israel’s memorisation of the holocaust) and Bucholc (in her 
focus on the past remembered through the lens of the Church) deal more with 
memory than with habitus, although both argue quite convincingly that these 
memories have also had their influence on habitus. The other pole is represent-
ed by Mennell’s account of American habitus: there will be scarcely one Amer-
ican who would be aware of it and even fewer would have any idea of its ori-
gins; the same goes for Turkey’s warrior-habitus or for the Hungarian inability 
to trust the state (a distrust which is even more outspoken in the case of 
Greece). 
In order to summarise the central insights of the papers assembled in this Spe-
cial Issue, we return to the pragmatic context that makes them relevant. Most 
important in this respect are a series of major political and economic incidenc-
es. These include the global movement of migrants of the past decade, and the 
subsequent European drama of their reception; the economic crisis of 2007 and 
2008 and its consequences in the decade afterwards – both developments, in 
different ways, partly paving the way for the rise of populism in Western Eu-
rope and North America and authoritarianism in some other regions (like Rus-
sia, Hungary, Poland, Turkey, or the Philippines). What do such developments 
mean for the explanatory contribution of national habitus, we-feelings, and 
political authoritarianism in coping with “situations” – namely macrostructural 
events – of this scale and character? Could it not be that an analysis of “situa-
tions” here has much greater explanatory utility than that of “habitus?”  
Let us look at the examples at hand. In two countries – Hungary and Poland 
– the pressures related to migratory influxes were comparatively small, but 
national “we-feelings” and “they-feelings” against foreigners played, nonethe-
less, a major role. Bucholc and Hadas have shown that it was not only a certain 
habitus that is responsible for such developments (although the troubled past of 
these societies with mighty neighbours, aristocratic overlords, and missing 
middle classes had their indisputable influence), but also the choreographed 
identity-politics of a new political class, based on a highly selective social 
memory. In the case of Poland, at least, it was not simply migration itself that 
became the object of fear, but the invocation of an enduring emotional experi-
ence of being surrounded and also overwhelmed by stronger neighbours (what 
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Bucholc refers to using the metaphor of colonialism and the “postcolonial 
syndrome”) that appeared to shape all Polish reactions to perceived threats 
from outside. These reactions can be correctly called “nationalist.” However, in 
such reactions, several aspects have to be distinguished: the “situational,” since 
they show themselves only when there are “stimuli” to react against; a particu-
lar we-feeling that is also partly situational, partly habitualised; a peculiar “na-
tional Polish identity,” which is developed as element of conscious strategy 
corresponding to certain national we-ideals rather more than authentic and 
accurate we-images; and, crucially, the drawing upon of deeper and uncon-
scious levels of habitus developed through formative mints. Differing in signif-
icant ways from the Polish and Hungarian cases, Denmark and Ireland have 
developed their similarly restrictive policies towards migration on the basis of a 
welfare state-centred habitus that privileges indigenous nationals at the cost of 
foreigners against the background of a late nation-building process resulting 
from war (with Prussia) and rebellion (against the English). In other cases, we 
can witness the role of similar nationalist we-feelings, related to migration, 
playing a central role in political developments, including, most notably, the 
case of Brexit in the UK (Dunning and Hughes). 
The second subject is that of political authoritarianism, perceived either as a 
dangerous lurch towards it (Poland, Hungary) or the companion of political 
backwardness – a sign of missing modernity. For the latter, the cases of Turkey 
and Iran are particularly telling. The study of national habitus undertaken here 
reaches far back to the history of a very complex survival unit (Kḯnlḯ and Kḯnlḯ 
on the Ottoman Empire, Persia) preceding any kind of nation state. This means 
that what constitutes a national habitus today has been formed in times before 
there was a nation. Here, national we-feelings and habitus can follow quite 
divergent pathways. In such cases, only some aspects of habitus are explanato-
rily significant. Here, as also in the case of Greece, national habitus and delib-
erately chosen aspects of national identity (difficult to develop) do not con-
verge smoothly. 
Third, there were several contributions that highlighted the complex rela-
tionship between national we-feelings, identity, and habitus from other angles. 
As a companion to American global dominance, Mennell has identified an 
enduring vein of ethnocentric feelings of superiority at the level of national 
habitus that runs counter to some sacred traits of American identity which 
coalesce around a national we-ideal of democratic modesty rather than a singu-
lar, correct we-image. Similarly complex is the relationship between identity 
and habitus in Germany and Japan, with sport at the foreground of the analyses 
of Reicher and Ahira. German “Turnen” was originally the peaceful comple-
ment to the more militant practices of the duelling fraternities (Burschenschaf-
ten) and their contribution to a German habitus. Its decline and eventual disap-
pearance with the rise of modern “sport” has had probably more profound 
consequences for German national identity than for German national habitus. 
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The same might be true for Japan – that a sporting event with typical Japanese 
characteristics, but developed already under European influence, can shift to a 
Pan-Asiatic one, has more to tell about the changes of Japanese national identi-
ty than about habitus since it stands for a deliberate opening to the outer world. 
Taken as a whole, our contributions attest to the development of greater Eu-
ropean, or even global, webs of entanglement between nations-states, national 
we-images, and national identities, which serve to demonstrate not only the 
restrictive “lag effects” of national habitus, but also the concomitant counter-
vailing pressures to homogenise habitus through changes in the respective 
national identities – a global process of functional democratisation that might 
one day come to restrict the power of its contemporary hegemon and its habitus 
of superiority. 
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